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Abstract 
The relationship between democracy and terrorism remains a source of significant 
debate, with academic evidence suggesting that democracy both inhibits, and 
encourages, acts of terrorism and political violence. Accepting this apparent 
contradiction, this paper argues that a more nuanced approach to understanding 
political systems, focussing on the subjective perceptions of individual actors, may 
allow these differences to be reconciled. 
Using regression analysis undertaken with UK data from the European Values 
Study, the results shows how attitudes to politics may frame assessments of the 
intrinsic valence – or attractiveness – of political participation, support for terrorism, 
and the implications this may have for both counter terrorism and counter extremism 
policy.  
- 
Introduction 
The first decades of the twenty first century have been characterised by a number of 
significant changes in Western counter terrorism policy. To counter the emergence 
of new security threats – most notably those exemplified in the attacks of 9/11 - a 
broad range of security measures have been adopted to strengthen the efficacy of 
Western state responses, from the introduction of bulk electronic surveillance and 
the tightening of airline security, to economic sanctions against hostile foreign 
powers and, in some cases, direct military intervention. 
The enthusiastic embrace of ‘liberal interventionism’ post-9/11 (Parmar, 2009) and 
the US-led invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan in support of regime change are, 
perhaps, the most striking – and contested – legacy of this period. Indeed, the 
underlying assumption – that terrorism almost always originates in the politics of 
autocratic and despotic states – is clearly visible in Western foreign policy in this 
period, with enforced democratisation posited as a logical and effective way of 
eliminating the terror threat and creating new allies that were “…free, proud, and 
fighting terror” (Bush, 2003).  
However, with the explosive growth in both domestic and international security 
threats since the invasion of Iraq, such an argument can no longer be un-
problematically embraced. Rather, the exact nature of the relationship between 
democracy and terrorism is likely to be more opaque – and non-linear - than popular 
political discourse would suggest.  
This paper is an attempt to deconstruct this relationship, offering analysis of UK 
survey data on political attitudes to explore how specific characteristics of the 
domestic political environment may shape attitudes to – and thus, engagement in – 
acts of terrorism and political violence. 
Democracy and Terrorism: A Review of the Literature 
The nature of the relationship between democracy and terrorism has been subject to 
significant academic interest over the last 16 years, with a search of the literature 
identifying over 1,000 academic papers that address this subject1. 
Of these, a significant number can be placed within one of two broad approaches: 
those that argue that democratic systems increase the incidence of terrorism – 
termed the Strategic School – and those that argue that democracy inhibits terrorism 
– termed the Political Access School (Eyermann, 1998). Both are implicitly shaped 
by the assumptions of economic rationality embedded in rational actor theory, with 
the former arguing that the openness of democratic societies and their inability to 
retaliate against threats may increase the threat of terrorism, and the latter arguing 
that the provision of alternate pathways to political engagement in democracies may 
lower the occurrence of terrorism (Eyerman, 1998). 
Empirical studies seeking to test these approaches are divided in their results, with 
papers finding evidence both for and against both schools. Indeed, analysis by Wade 
and Reiter (2007) found no link between regime type and the occurrence of suicide 
terrorism, while Piazza (2007) found that democratic and politically liberal nations 
experienced a higher rate of terrorism, and Li (2005) found that transnational 
terrorism was more likely in less democratic states. 
The picture is further complicated by the results of studies showing a more complex 
relationship between regime type and the incidence of terrorism, with some showing 
that highly democratic and highly authoritarian regimes experience less terrorism 
than countries in the ‘intermediate range’ on both indicators (Abadie, 2004), and 
                                                            
1 Google Scholar search, 30th August 2016 
others suggesting that the longevity and ‘newness’ of the regime may be the most 
potent indicators of terror risk (Piazza, 2013). 
A potential explanation for these significant variations may lie in the limitations, 
methodologically, of much of the extant work – most notably in respect of its 
characterisation of political systems. Indeed, as Piazza (2013) rightly notes, 
democracies not are not immutable, and shift and evolve over time. More than this, 
as Abadie (2004) notes, ‘democracy’ and ‘authoritarianism’ are not absolute binaries, 
but rather points on a continuum on which most political systems may be placed. As 
a result, attempts to draw links between political systems and terrorism that fail to 
account for these variations are doomed to fail. 
In addition, any account that seeks to explain the relationship between terrorism and 
political system should be able to account for the role of individual perceptions of the 
political process, accommodating the significant variations that exist within and 
between countries, communities and individuals in terms of attitudes to political 
processes. 
Indeed, the extent to which political systems may be characterised as democratic or 
authoritarian varies enormously from person to person. More than this, it has long 
been recognised that individual perceptions play a significant role in shaping 
recourse to violence, with both Crenshaw (1981) and Wintrobe (2005) noting that 
individuals are more likely to endorse violence if they believe there to be no viable 
alternatives. This aligns with work by Piazza (2007) that links failed states and 
violence, and work by Corrado and Evans (1988) that explores radical leftist 
terrorism, arguing that organisations chose violent means precisely because of the 
perceived deficiencies of democratic engagement 
On a more quantitative level, work by Nasir, Ali and Rehman (2011) suggests a link 
between terrorism and social repression or the restriction of civil and political rights, 
suggesting that terrorism is more likely amongst those who have few alternatives, 
while Morse’ (2006) work on selectorate theory2 and support for terrorism showed a 
positive correlation between the size of a governing party’s electoral majority and 
support for violence by non-state actors. Cherney and Povey’s (2013) study of 
support for violence in majority Sunni Muslim countries adds further weight to this 
view, finding that membership of the Shia Muslim minority correlated with support for 
violence, while Morgenstern (2009) found that Muslims were less supportive of 
terrorism if they lived in a functioning democracy, highlighting the importance of 
asymmetrical power relationship3 in determining the strategic calculus that underlies 
engagement in – and support for – violence. 
 
A revised approach 
As both Wintrobe (2005) and Eyerman (1998) acknowledge, the existence of 
alternative political strategies should reduce the likelihood of an individual endorsing 
violence. Given Hudson’s (1999) work asserting the rationality of terrorists, it seems 
fair to suggest that the choice of strategy will be made on the basis of an individual’s 
assessment as to which approach represents the best balancing of costs and 
benefits. As such, support for violence should depend not merely on the presence of 
alternative options, but on the influences that shape how these alternatives are 
                                                            
2 With roots in the work of Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) selectorate theory argues that political 
leaders aim principally to stay in power, and that to this end make decisions principally to appeal to 
those whose support makes the difference between retaining and losing power (the winning coalition) 
rather than benefiting either the broader community contributing to the selection process (the real 
selectorate) or those eligible but non-contributing (the nominal selectorate). 
3 That is to say, the strategic calculus is shaped by the comparative weakness of the attacker, and the 
comparative strength of the state. 
perceived. In the context of democratic political engagement – perhaps the most 
obvious alternative to violence (at least in the developed world) – this would 
comprise the factors that shape how mainstream politics is perceived, most 
obviously trust in political institutions, trust in politicians, and trust in executive actors.  
Similarly as the literature suggests that certain organizations may be ideologically 
hostile to democracy, membership of these groups may dictate the adherent’s 
willingness to consider democratic engagement as a strategy (most notably the 
assertion by some radical Islamic clerics that democracy is haram (forbidden) – see 
Saalih al-Munajjid, 2014). In such circumstances, even if democratic alternatives to 
violence were accessible, and were seen to be effective, their adoption would be 
unlikely. 
Considering these factors together provides a basis for approximating an individual’s 
perception of the attractiveness of democracy as a strategy for pursuing their political 
goals – hereafter ‘Democratic Valence’. I argue that these attitudes may predict 
support for terrorism and political violence more effectively than macro-level 
categorisations of the political system.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Method 
To test this theory, this paper employed logistic regression analysis, using weighted 
data from the 4th wave of the European Values Study4. A binary dependent variable, 
Support for Terrorism, was used alongside control measures for Age (scale), 
Democratic Valence (scale), Gender (binary), Marital Status (binary), Employment 
                                                            
4 The European Values Study is a major population representative survey exploring ideas, beliefs, preferences, 
attitudes, values and opinions of citizens from 47 European states. Further information can be found online at 
the EVS website: http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/ 
Status (binary), Post-Secondary Education (binary) and Employment Type 
(categorical). Significance was calculated at the 10% level5. 
Reflecting the multi-dimensional nature of the political attitudes under examination, 
the dependent variable – Democratic Valence - was a factor formed from measures 
of Democratic Satisfaction, Trust in Parliament, Trust in Political Parties, and Trust in 
the Police. Quartimax Rotated Principal Axis Factoring was used to increase the 
likelihood of components loading onto a single factor, with outputs saved as simple 
regression coefficients to facilitate easy analysis. A detailed breakdown of the 
component loadings is displayed in Table 1, below. 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
  
                                                            
5 The decision to calculate significance at the 10% level was taken due to small overall sample size and the preliminary nature of the test. 
While the 5% level is most commonly used in social science research, the 10% level is frequently employed in studies with small data sets or 
in cases where the risk of identifying a false positive is outweighed by the consequences of type II error – see Gerber and Malhotra (2008). 
While it is accepted that this doubles the chance that of analysis returning a false result, it is submitted that without repeat testing of the 
relationship with additional data sets a single test will be no more likely to provide a reliable even if working to a more conventional alpha 
level – see Rosnow and Rosenthal (1989). 
Variables were introduced in two blocks: the first introducing the control measures, 
and the second adding the factor approximating Democratic Valence. The model 
Chi-square for the first block was 14.327, with 8 degrees of freedom (p = .074). The 
Hosmer-Lemeshow test returned a chi-square statistic of 7.359 with 8 degrees of 
freedom (p = .498). Nagelkerke’s pseudo-R² confirmed moderate but adequate 
goodness of fit (R² = .027).  
Only gender (OR = 1.584, p = .042) and marital status (OR = 0.584, p = .022) were 
found significant in the first block, with male respondents showing an increased 
propensity to support terrorism relative to female respondents. Being married was 
also shown to negatively associate with support for terrorism, with all other variables 
non-significant at the 10% level. This, alongside the modest Nagelkerke values, may 
be taken to indicate that demographic factors alone are poor predictors of support for 
terrorism, a possibility discussed at length in much of the existing quantitative 
literature on support for terrorism. 
[Table 2 about here] 
Outputs for the second block of variables, introducing the factor approximating 
democratic valence, are displayed in Table 2. The overall model chi-square rose to 
17.605 with 9 degrees of freedom (p = .040) as a result of a block contribution of 
3.278 with 1 degree of freedom (p = .070). The Nagelkerke pseudo-R² increased 
slightly to R² = .033, showing that the addition of democratic valence improves the 
overall fit of the model. The Hosmer-Lemeshow statistic remained insignificant (Chi-
square of 12.620 with 8 degrees of freedom, p = .126), indicating that the model 
continued to predict the observed data well. 
Of those variables retained from the first model both gender (OR = 1.573, p = .046) 
and marital status (OR = 0.593, p = .026) remained significant, with males and the 
unmarried again showing elevated levels of support for terrorism at a level consistent 
with the scale and direction of effect shown in the first block. The measure for 
democratic valence attained significance at the 10% level (OR = 0.802, p = .074), 
with the odds ratio suggesting that increases in the favourability of perceptions of the 
political system decrease the likelihood of supporting terrorism 
Discussion 
In showing that democratic valence is a correlate of support for terrorism, these 
results may be taken to support the centrality of individual perceptions of the political 
process in determining the relationship between democracy and terrorism. While it is 
important to be circumspect in the absence of further corroboratory evidence, there 
are nevertheless several important implications raised by these results. 
 
In particular, by showing that levels of support for terrorism are inversely correlated 
with the perceived attractiveness of democratic political strategies, these results may 
be taken to highlight the role played by the individual’s weighing of the costs and 
benefits of different courses of political action, suggesting that they are a significant 
predictor of support for terrorism. In this the results may be argued to be consistent 
with research positing that terrorism is a rational choice made by desperate 
individuals in pursuit of political goals (Wintrobe, 2005).  
 
In addition to its challenging of macro-level analyses, this represents a significant 
challenge to much of the qualitative work on the causes of terrorism, and in particular 
to those suggesting that violence largely results from ideological and moral 
imperatives rather than strategic considerations. While the models in this paper did 
not control for the impact of religious ideology or perceptions of moral imperatives, in 
showing that practical considerations of efficacy correlate with support for terrorism 
the results logically challenge arguments that focus on the importance of ideology. 
Indeed, it seems unlikely on the basis of these findings that violence could be 
endorsed for the desire to appease moral principles or ideological beliefs alone; if 
ideology were the most important cause of violence, one would expect the impact of 
democratic valence to be non-significant. While it remains possible for the model to 
account for the effects of ideology through its impact on the individual's perceptions 
of the democratic process, further research would be necessary to explore this. 
Despite this, both anecdotal evidence and work on the impact of extreme religious 
adherence on social and political trust (Schoenfeld, 1978; La Porta et al, 1997; 
Welch et al, 2004; Berggren and Jordahl, 2006; Uslaner, 2008, 2011) offer grounds 
for speculation, suggesting that some ideologies may negatively impact elements of 
democratic valence, reducing the favourability of perceptions of democratic 
engagement and thus increasing the relative attractiveness of violence. 
Alongside this the findings also have significance in terms of their contribution to the 
literature on the demographics of supporters of terrorism. While a small but growing 
body of evidence has explored the demography of Muslim supporters of political 
violence (Fair and Shepherd, 2006; Cherney and Povey, 2013), few papers have 
attempted to show the effect of demographic characteristics on support for terrorism 
in the general population. In showing that men and the unmarried were more likely to 
support violence than women and the unmarried, the results of this paper highlight a 
significant difference compared to studies of Muslim supporters of violence, adding 
further weight to research suggesting that there is, in general, no single extremist 
'profile' (Williams, 2016). This accords with the work of Hudson (1999), and has 
significant implications for policy responses to extremism and terrorism. 
.  
Policy Implications 
The findings of this analysis also have a number of implications for counter-
extremism and counter-terrorism policy, both at the general level and in the context 
of the UK-government’s PREVENT programme. By showing that attitudes to 
democratic politics predict support for political violence, it can be argued that a core 
component of the PREVENT strategy has been validated, endorsing the 
identification in both government rhetoric and the Channel guidance (Home Office, 
2011) of attitudes to democracy and government as indicators of extremist risk. 
Given the paucity of research and publicly available evaluation activity that 
addresses the PREVENT strategy (Lamb, 2013; Thomas, 2010), such a finding is 
significant in and of itself. However, by showing a link between democratic valence 
and support for violence that is consistent with the theoretical model advanced in this 
paper, the results also raise several more specific issues. 
In particular, the PREVENT strategy caries an implicit assumption that attitudes to 
government, extreme religious views, and regular contact with known extremists are 
symptoms, rather than causes, of radicalisation, leaving the root reasons for 
individual engagement with extreme and violent organisations and causes opaque. 
While further research is necessary to definitively determine whether the relationship 
highlighted in this paper is causal, the results presented here may be taken to 
challenge the automatic assumption of direction present in Channel’s framing of 
attitudes to government. 
If further research were to corroborate the existence of a causal relationship, then a 
different approach to counter-extremism would be desirable, with interventions 
focussed not on delegitimizing the cause or goals that violence is employed to 
support (as suggested by the current iteration of the Channel guidance) but on 
attacking the structural factors that underpin the decision calculus through which 
violence is endorsed as the primary strategic tool.  
Such a shift could be accommodated in the current delivery model, with the use of 
multi-stakeholder partnerships and early intervention likely to remain key. Particularly 
in respect of the young, opportunities exist for youth and religious leaders, parents, 
and social and community workers to engage in the promotion of democratic 
governance and political engagement as a foil to extremist risk. Such an approach 
would have obvious merits, both in terms of a reduction in violence – in line with the 
broader aims of the CONTEST strategy – and by fostering a less hostile and more 
trusting political environment.  
These findings also suggest that educators could play a greater role in countering 
extremism by granting the study of government and politics greater prominence in 
schools. As research evidence suggests that many young people fail to understand 
the political system (Henn, Weinstein and Forrest, 2009), are suspicious of its 
efficacy, and distrust the probity and the motivation of those engaged in its delivery 
(Bartlett and Miller, 2010), such an approach would have obvious merit. More than 
this, as the young are less likely to be engaged in traditional modes of political 
participation (Henn, Weinstein and Forrest, 2005) than earlier generations, it is 
unlikely that they would have opportunities to gain sufficient exposure to mainstream 
politics to challenge their negative preconceptions without proactive efforts on the 
part of educators. By making the study of government and politics a core part of the 
national curriculum (perhaps as part of an enlarged citizenship programme) the 
government could do much to achieve this goal, with the study of parliamentary 
process, political history, and contemporary political issues offering the young not 
only a better understanding of our political system, but a basis for holding the 
improved perceptions of fairness, accessibility and probity that are key to increasing 
democratic valence and decreasing the risk of violence. 
Similarly, the results also raise questions regarding the role of media coverage in 
shaping support for terrorism. As Flinders (2010) notes, contemporary media 
coverage of politics is largely characterised by portrayals of politicians as sleazy, 
corrupt, greedy and ineffective. As research indicates that negative media coverage 
of politics encourages the public to hold negative views of politics and politicians 
(Patterson, 1993), and the findings of this paper suggest that these attitudes 
correlate with support for terrorism, it seems reasonable to assume that media 
coverage of politics may inadvertently be increasing support for terrorism.  
While further research is required to definitively ascertain whether this is the case, 
this raises the possibility of the media playing a part in reducing support for terrorism. 
In particular, the adoption by the media of a more positive tone in coverage of 
political events - focussing on the significant successes delivered by democratic 
politics (for example, universal free healthcare, public education, etc.) rather than the 
personal shortcomings of the actors involved in its day-to-day life -  may do much to 
improve perceptions of politics and reduce support for violence While it is clearly 
impractical – and, indeed, undesirable – for politicians to mandate positive coverage, 
greater responsibility on the part of media organisations could do much to address 
these issues.  
Similarly, mainstream parties, and political organisations could do much to improve 
popular perceptions of politics themselves, with more concerted engagement with 
the public a good way to challenge the popular view – seen prominently during the 
recent EU referendum campaign - that politicians are a scornful elite disinterested in 
the views and mood of the public outside of election periods (Harris, 2016). A 
systemic shift in the conduct of British politics, the adoption of a more long-term 
focus, and engagement with the public as citizens rather than mere voters, could do 
much to address this, and would seem an essential pre-requisite for lasting change. 
However outreach work by individual politicians – for example, spending more time 
in their constituencies, greater involvement in local non-political organizations, and 
greater use of direct democracy – may also do much address these problems.  
 
Conclusions 
This paper has sought to reconcile the seemingly differing results of existing 
academic analyses of the relationship between democracy and terrorism, 
highlighting the importance of individual perceptions of politics and political systems 
as determinants of support for terrorism. As a test of this approach it has offered the 
results of regression analysis exploring the link between democratic valence – 
comprising political and executive trust and satisfaction with democracy - and 
support for terrorism using UK EVS data.  
While political attitudes and support for terrorism have been shown to correlate, 
further research is necessary to validate the existence of the relationship, to 
establish causation, and to support the making of generalizations outside of the 
narrow frame employed in this analysis.  
In particular, more sophisticated analyses and replication with non-majority 
population and non-UK data are required if claims to general applicability and 
causation are to be sustained.  Nevertheless, these findings represent an important 
first test of the theory outlined in this paper which, if replicated in further analysis, 
has significant implications for both policy and academic research in this area. 
In particular, this paper has highlighted the potential significance of these results in 
respect of theories of ideological motivation, rational choice approaches to terrorism, 
and the literature on the demographic traits of terrorists. More than this, it has 
highlighted a number of areas where the results suggest British counter-extremism 
policy could usefully be revised - particularly around adopting a focus on fostering 
pro-democratic attitudes and access to political institutions - and has also identified 
the impact of media coverage of politics on attitudes to political participation as an 
area for concern and further research. 
Future papers may wish to focus on the areas identified above, as well as exploring 
the impact of religion on political attitudes and employing more complex analytical 
procedures and designs in order to provide a more robust basis for making causal 
inferences.  
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Table 1 – Component Loadings for EVS Democratic Valence Measure  
 Component Loading 
Trust in Parliament 0.887 
Trust in Political Parties 0.658 
Trust in the Police 0.391 
Democratic Satisfaction 0.500 
 
Table 2 – Regression Analysis of Support for Violence, Democratic Valence, and 
Demographic Control Measures 
 B SE B OR P 
Age -.007 .007 .930 .284 
Male .453 .227 1.573 .046** 
Married -.522 .235 .530 .026** 
Employed -.330 .258 .719 .200 
Type of Work     
Higher .085 .285 1.089 .149 
Intermediate .162 .335 1.175 .254 
Other/Don’t Know .580 .401 1.785 .372 
Post-Secondary 
Education 
.189 .274 1.208 .491 
Democratic 
Valence 
-.221 .124 .802 .074* 
*p>=.100, **p>=.050, ***p>=.010 
 
Figure 1 - Schematic Representation of Proposed Rational Choice Model of 
Support for Terrorism and Political Violence 
 
 
